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This paper  examines  the reﬂexive  interplay  between  individual  decisions  and  social  forces
to analyze  the evolution  of  cooperation  in  the  presence  of  “multi-directedness,”  whereby
people’s  preferences  depend  on  their  psychological  motives.  People  have  access  to multiple,
discrete motives.  Different  motives  may  be  activated  by  different  social  settings.  Inter-
individual  differences  in dispositional  types  affect  the responsiveness  of  people’s  motives
to their  social  settings.  The  evolution  of  these  dispositional  types  is driven  by  changes  in
the  frequencies  of  social  settings.  In this  context,  economic  policies  can inﬂuence  economic
decisions  not  merely  by  modifying  incentives  operating  through  given  preferences,  but also
by inﬂuencing  people’s  motives  (thereby  changing  their preferences)  and  by  changing  the
distribution  of  dispositional  types  in the  population  (thereby  changing  their  motivational
responsiveness  to  social  settings).
© 2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
This paper takes a new approach in exploring the social foundations of human cooperation. Building on a vast literature in
motivation psychology,1 the individual is understood to have access to multiple, discrete motives, each of which is associated
with a distinct objective. In short, people are recognized to be “multi-directed.”
Our analysis shows how different motives may  be activated by different social settings. Some social settings encourage
prosocial motives; other discourage them. Changes in social settings may  lead to changes in motives. Thus preferences are
 The authors would like to acknowledge support from the Institute for New Economic Thinking under grant INO13-00036. We would also like to thank
George  Akerlof, Rachel Kranton, Paul Collier, Jean-Paul Carvalho, Robert Akerlof and George Soros for feedback, as well as seminar participants at the Kiel
Institute for the World Economy, the Max  Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, the University of Pittsburgh, and attendees at the American Economic
Association 2015 Annual Meeting, the SBRCR 2015 Workshop, the 3rd TILEC Economic Governance Workshop, and the WZB  Interdisciplinary Perspectives
on  Decision Making Workshop.
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 4318814235.
E-mail addresses: steven.bosworth@ifw-kiel.de (S.J. Bosworth), singer@cbs.mpg.de (T. Singer), dennis.snower@ifw-kiel.de (D.J. Snower).
1 Heckhausen and Heckhausen (2010) provide an excellent survey.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.12.005
0167-2681/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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ot located exclusively in the individual, but rather become the outcome of the interplay between the individual and her
ocial environment.
The social settings are understood as well-deﬁned and structured in advance of individuals’ entry into them. For instance,
ust as a tennis match structures the relations between the players, tournament wage contracts and team remuneration
chemes exert different motivational inﬂuences on employees. In the model below, social settings are speciﬁed in terms of
he strategic complementarities or substitutabilities between agents. Since social settings can affect agents’ motives, they
nﬂuence their behavior not just via their beliefs and constraints, but also in terms of their objectives.
Our analysis provides new insights into the role of “social balance” in economic decision making. The balance between
eeting the needs of the individual and the community is shown to arise from the interplay between social settings and
ersonal traits. The greater the relative frequency of cooperative settings (displaying strategic complementarities) relative
o competitive settings (characterized by strategic substitutabilities), the greater is the degree to which pro-social traits will
hrive relative to selﬁsh ones. Due to plasticity of traits, changes in social settings inﬂuence the composition of traits in the
opulation, thereby further changing the social balance between pro-social and selﬁsh behavior patterns. Such changes in
ocial balance can have signiﬁcant welfare implications, since people with pro-social traits obviously internalize some of
he externalities in social dilemma situations, whereas those with selﬁsh traits do not.
In our analysis, cooperation among economic agents is not merely generated by economic synergies among self-interested
gents with unique preferences (as in the gains from trade brought about by Adam Smith’s invisible hand). Instead, it arises
rom people’s motivated decisions in different social settings, some of which may  be more conducive to prosociality than
thers. Since agents are multi-directed, they do not have unique preferences and are thus not consistently self-interested
r consistently altruistic. Instead, their objectives depend on the interplay between their individual traits and their social
ettings. In this context, creating a more cooperative society involves creating not just new economic synergies, but also
ocial settings that elicit more cooperative motives and a greater frequency of altruistic dispositional types (by affecting the
ayoffs from the social settings).
Our analysis can help shed light on why individual behaviors in social dilemma situations often contradict the pre-
ictions of economic theory. In particular, people frequently cooperate in the absence of compensation, but to varying
egrees depending on their individual traits and their social settings. We  know for example that people engage in sub-
tantial philanthropic activity, voluntary work, and social activism. We  also know that there is a wide heterogeneity of
ooperative tendencies across people. Some people have a greater tendency to cooperate in social dilemmas than others,
hough individual-level behavior can, but need not ﬂuctuate (Van Lange et al., 1997; Volk et al., 2012). In terms of our model,
eople’s willingness to cooperate under some social settings, but not others, can be accounted for by changes in their motives
n response to these settings. Under settings featuring strategic complementarities, they may  be willing to cooperate even
n the absence of compensation.
This analytical context provides a broader framework for policy analysis than conventional theory permits and thereby
heds light on new opportunities for policies to affect cooperation among economic agents – opportunities that are generally
gnored in mainstream neoclassical analysis. Whereas neoclassical economic theory focuses on the effect of policies on
conomic incentives, speciﬁed with regard to given preferences, our model also shows how policies can inﬂuence people’s
ocial settings, which changes their motives and thereby alters their preferences. Over the longer run, policies can also
ffect the payoffs from these social settings, which may  change the distribution of dispositional types and thereby alter the
esponsiveness of motives to social settings.
We claim that traditional economic theory overlooks signiﬁcant sources of human economic cooperation by restricting
ts policy purview to incentives for self-interested agents with exogenous preferences. Beyond that, its policy prescriptions
ay even be counter-productive in some circumstances, since its proposed policies may  crowd out pro-social motives (for
xample, Frey and Jegen, 2001; Gneezy et al., 2011; Bowles and Polanía-Reyes, 2012).2 Our analysis shows how policies may
rowd out motivation to cooperate when they increase the degree to which situations discourage cooperation or increase
he prevalence of such settings. By contrast, policies crowd in cooperation when they provide state- or trait-based support
or cooperative motives.
This extension of policy analysis beyond traditional monetary incentives has far-reaching implications. In mainstream
conomic theory, the purpose of economic policy is primarily to correct for externalities and inequalities. Externalities (social
osts and beneﬁts for which individuals receive no private compensation) are internalized by providing the appropriate
ompensation to self-regarding individuals. By contrast, in our analysis the degree to which externalities are internalized
epends crucially on which motives are activated: what must be compensated under a selﬁsh motive may  become implicitly
nternalized under a pro-social motive. By examining how different social settings can activate different motives, our analysis
aves the way toward an understanding of how economic decisions may  be shaped not just be monetary incentives, but also
y the social organization within which economic interactions take place. Thereby our analysis can provide a rationale for
he inﬂuence of framing, choice architecture and nudging on economic activities, at least with regard to the social aspects
f these phenomena.
2 Two conﬂicting examples may  be found in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) and Gelcich et al. (2013). Gneezy and Rustichini ﬁnd that volunteering goes
own  when small payments are introduced for collected donations, while Gelcich et al. ﬁnd that the introduction of sanctions that should be small enough
ot  to deter exploitation of a common pool resource do in fact deter exploitation.
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Thus policies can affect economic behavior not just by inﬂuencing payoffs for a given set of preferences, but also by
changing these preferences. These preference changes are associated with motivational changes, which arise from changes in
policy-induced payoffs and policy-induced social settings, as well as changes in dispositional types arising from longer-term
policy-induced payoffs to each type.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the salient insights of the paper, providing the
intuitions underlying the model that follows. Section 3 describes the motives and the social settings in which agents interact
with one another. Section 4 analyzes how dispositional types are shaped by social settings. Section 5 examines the resulting
“social topography,” characterizing the equilibrium distribution of the dispositional types. Section 6 explores the effects of
policies designed to increase cooperation. Finally Section 7 concludes.
2. Basic insights
We  begin by deﬁning the three basic concepts of our analysis: motives, social settings and dispositional types. A motive,  in
the sense that the word is commonly used in motivation psychology, is a force that gives direction and energy to one’s behav-
ior, thereby determining the objective of the behavior, as well as its intensity and persistence.3 The psychology literature
has identiﬁed a number of different motives, such as the achievement,4 afﬁliation5 and power6 motives. In the model here,
however, we focus on two motives: a Self-interested Wanting7 motive (aimed at maximizing one’s own personal payoff)
and a Caring8 motive (aimed at maximizing joint payoffs).
In the model below, the Self-interested Wanting motive is represented by the utility function of the standard selﬁsh,
rational agent of neoclassical microeconomics. The Caring motive resembles the utility function of what is usually termed
a ‘pure altruist’ by behavioral economists (see, e.g. Andreoni, 1990). The paradigmatic example of this motive is that which
drives a mother to care for her infant. In the evolutionary process, the Caring motive induces parents to support their
offspring over the vulnerable childhood stage. It also carries over to helpful, compassionate behavior of more distant human
kin and non-kin. Its evolutionary function is clearly to promote cooperation necessary for survival. Psychologically, this
system is associated with feelings of affection, compassion, nurturance, friendliness and warmth related to prosocial goals,9
particularly concern for the wellbeing of others.10
A social setting is a joint activity of several people producing a distribution of payoffs. In our model, there are just two
social settings: a Cooperative setting (with complementary actions) and a Competitive setting (with substitutable actions).
In a Cooperative setting, one person’s contribution increases the productivity (payoff per unit of contribution) of another
person involved in these activities. It includes activities such as household production, collaboration in teams, and common
goods with increasing marginal beneﬁts. In a Competitive setting, one participant’s contribution reduces the productivity of
another participant. The activities in this setting include tournament contracts in labor markets, striving for social position
and other contests, as well as common goods with diminishing marginal beneﬁts.11
We  will show that, from the perspective on an individual participant, the Self-interested Wanting motive is relatively
well-suited to the Competitive setting, whereas the Caring motive is relatively well-suited to the Cooperative setting. In the
Cooperative setting, one individual’s cooperation implies that the best response of others is to become more Cooperative as
well. On this account, people’s actions are strategic complements. In the Competitive setting, one individual’s cooperation
induces more selﬁsh behavior as a best response. Thereby people’s actions become strategic substitutes.12
In the model below, social settings describe the contexts in which people make their decisions, and these contexts
are shown to affect their motives. For this purpose, it is convenient to restrict our analysis to social settings that are
exogenously given by existing institutions and customs, e.g. existing laws, cultures, norms, organizational structures, etc.
In practice, social settings – in terms of opportunities for cooperation or competition – are shaped not only by exist-
ing institutions and customs, but also by the participants, e.g. people pursuing careers in social work or banking. In our
model, a change in the available social settings may  induce a change in people’s motivations and thereby in their behavior
patterns.A disposition is a trait that can be interpreted as a crystalized motive. In the personality psychology literature, it is widely
accepted that dispositions and traits are crystalized states (e.g. Fleeson, 2001). Speciﬁcally, if a particular state (a motive, in
our model) is activated repeatedly and persistently, then this state becomes crystalized into a persistent disposition to act
3 See Elliot and Covington (2001), following Atkinson (1964).
4 See for example Atkinson and Feather (1966) and Pang (2010).
5 McClelland (1967), Heckhausen (1989), or Heckhausen and Heckhausen (2010).
6 For example, Heckhausen (1989), Heckhausen (2000), and Heckhausen and Heckhausen (2010).
7 This motivation system – the closest, though imperfect, match for the standard economic assumption of self-interest – does not receive much attention
in  the motivation psychology literature. See for example McDougall’s (1932) propensity for foraging and ownership and Reiss’ (2004) desire for eating, and
Gilbert’s (2013) seeking drive, an acquisition focused system.
8 This motive is concerned with nurturance, compassion, and care-giving, e.g. Weinberger et al. (2010). The caring motive is often distinguished from
the  afﬁliation motive, e.g. McDougall (1932), Murray’s (1938), McAdams (1980), Heckhausen (1989), and Heckhausen (2000).
9 See for example McAdams and Powers (1981) and Weinberger et al. (2010).
10 McAdams et al. (1984).
11 See Section 3.1 for an explanation and further speciﬁc examples.
12 The characterization of social settings in terms of strategic complementarities or substitutabilities is in the spirit of Bulow et al. (1985).
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n accordance with this state. In practice, people are driven by various different motives, each which can be conceived as
orresponding to different dispositional types. In the personality psychology literature, individual dispositional differences
re usually represented in terms of distributions with respect to each disposition. For example, anxious personality traits
re conceived as being normally distributed with the majority of people showing average degrees of the anxious trait and
nly minorities showing very high or very low levels of anxious trait.
For each of the two motives highlighted in our model – Self-interested Wanting and Caring – dispositions may crystalize,
o that individuals may  come to differ in terms of their propensity to Want (i.e. high on the Wanting scale are those with
trong appetitive consumption-oriented drives, whereas depressed people, for example, are low on this scale) and their
ropensity to Care (i.e. high on the Caring scale are those who  are altruistic, having a strong propensity to beneﬁt other
eople; whereas narcissistic people are low in this scale, for example). Different individuals may  be conceived as being
istributed along the distributions for these two  dispositions. In practice, virtually no one is positioned at the extreme
nds of the Wanting and Caring scales, and if people show extremes on these dispositional scales, they are often classiﬁed
ccording to pathological criteria. Furthermore, virtually everyone is able to modulate their degree of Wanting and Caring
n response to their environment. In other words, virtually everyone is “multi-directed,” in the sense that humans have
ultiple motives that can be differentially activated in different settings,13 but they differ in terms of their positions in
he dispositional distributions and thus also in their propensities to respond to particular external stimuli with particular
otives.14
For the sake of analytic simplicity, however, we  consider only three types of people, with the following special patterns of
ispositions: (1) a Selﬁsh type, representing the extreme high end of the Self-Interested Wanting dispositional distribution
nd the extreme low end of the Caring dispositional distribution, (2) a Caring type, representing the extreme high end of
he Caring dispositional distribution and the extreme low end of the Self-Interested Wanting dispositional distribution, and
3) a Responsive type, representing the mean of the Caring dispositional distribution and the mean of the Self-Interested
anting dispositional distribution.
By implication, the Self-interested type leads to the activation of the Self-interested Wanting motive in all social settings;
he Caring type leads to the activation of the Caring motive in all settings; and the Responsive type leads to the activation
f the Caring motive in the Cooperative settings and the Selﬁsh motive in the Competitive settings, but at a cost. Our
ategorization serves merely as an extreme analytical simpliﬁcation of individual dispositional differences, whereby some
eople are predominantly selﬁsh in most social settings and others are predominantly caring in these settings, whereas
thers adjust their behavior more responsively to the settings they encounter.
The simpliﬁcations of our model are meant to build a bridge between economic theory and motivation and personality
sychology. In neoclassical and behavioral economics, people are “single-directed” (possessing only one objective, given by
heir utility function). People of the Selﬁsh type are functionally equivalent to the single-directed, selﬁsh agents in standard
eoclassical economic analysis. People of the Caring type are akin to the single-directed individuals with altruistic preferences
n behavioral economics. We  introduce multi-directedness into economic theory through people of the Responsive type,
hose motives respond to their social settings (a phenomenon widely ignored in mainstream economics, but accepted as
biquitous in motivation and personality psychology).
The individuals in our model face stochastic social settings with idiosyncratic frequencies, in the sense that each individual
ncounters Competitive and Cooperative settings with the same probabilities, independently distributed across individuals
nd time. These probabilities determine the ﬁtness of the Selﬁsh, Caring and Responsive types, since the different types
ave different comparative advantages under different social settings. The greater the frequency of the Cooperative setting
relative to the Competitive one), the greater the comparative advantage (and thus the expected payoff) of the Caring type;
hereas the greater the frequency of the Competitive setting, the greater the expected payoff of the Selﬁsh type. Changes
n the frequency of social settings will change the comparative advantages of these types, which are assumed to lead to
hanges in the numbers of these types.
We deﬁne the social topography as the mapping of different agent types into different social settings. The social topography
ummarizes the overall context in which types are matched with social settings, thereby determining people’s contributions
nd payoffs from their social settings.
Once again, these analytical simpliﬁcations regarding the interconnections among motives, dispositional types and social
ettings are meant to capture essential features of a more complicated reality. As the relevant literatures in motivational
nd social psychology, affective neuroscience and evolutionary biology show,15 humans have access to far more than two
otivations; there exist far more than two social settings and these settings may  be distinguished through features other
13 Our conception of multi-directedness goes beyond framing effects, since the former links contextual stimuli to decision-making objectives, whereas
he  latter refers to context-driven cognitive biases. Multi-directed actions also differ from cue-driven ones (e.g. Laibson, 2001), since the former arises
rom  multiple motives whereas the latter arise from shifts in perception and attention. In the seminal paper by Bernheim and Rangel (2004) on addiction,
nvironmental cues affect behavior whenever individuals are in a “hot” mode, in which an individual chooses to consume an addictive substance irrespective
f  her underlying preferences; whereas in our model the environment helps shape these preferences.
14 In the psychology literature, social settings are known to affect the activation of motives both directly (a change in setting leading directly to a change
n  motive) and indirectly, since repeated exposure to a particular social setting, associated with repeated activation of a particular motive, will induce a
hange in dispositional type via plasticity of traits. In the model below, we focus on both channels.
15 A partial overview is provided in Przyrembel et al. (mimeo).
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than just actions that are strategic substitutes and complements; and it is useful to distinguish among more than three types
of people with different patterns of dispositional traits to understand individual differences in motivational responsiveness
to changes in social settings.
Our analysis encompasses the following basic insights, each of which is well-known in other disciplines (particu-
larly psychology, sociology, anthropology, biology and neuroscience), though commonly overlooked in economics thus
far.
2.1. Insight 1: All behavior is motivated, driven by multiple, discrete motives
Knowing a person’s prior choices and constraints is not sufﬁcient to determine the person’s behavior, as it is under
revealed preference theory. In line with the vast motivation psychology literature, we recognize that people generally
have access to multiple, discrete motives. Each motive is associated with a different objective function for economic
decisions.
Since our analysis explores the social opportunities for cooperative versus competitive decision making, it is useful to
contrast this motivational approach with the notion of preferences. While behavioral economics has extended the standard
neoclassical analysis through consideration of social preferences16 grounded in experimental evidence, what behavioral
and neoclassical economics have in common is the assumption that individual preferences are internally consistent, reason-
ably stable17 and context-independent.18 The novel contribution of our analysis lies in the recognition that the objectives
underlying an individual’s economic decisions depend on the individual’s active motives and that these motives may  be
affected by the individual’s social setting, which may  change predictably and abruptly. In this context, preferences need not
be internally consistent and temporally stable across motives.
While we restrict our analysis to two motives – Self-interested Wanting and Caring – it is important to emphasize that
Care is obviously not the only pro-social motive. (Another important one for example is afﬁliation, i.e. the motive to belong
to a social group and adhere to its norms.19)
2.2. Insight 2: Motives are inﬂuenced by social settings
Broadly conceived, an individual’s social setting is meant to represent the entire structure of interpersonal relationships
and interactions into which the individual may  enter. The content of these relationships and interactions may  be well-deﬁned
and structured in advance of individuals’ entry into them.
Different social settings give rise to different motives. This pattern is reinforced by the fact that different motives are
differentially well-suited to different social settings in terms of the outcome they generate for the decision maker. In
our model, as noted, we consider Competitive settings (in which people’s actions are strategic substitutes) and Coop-
erative settings (in which people’s actions are strategic complements). We  will show that the Self-interested Wanting
motive is relatively well suited for Competitive settings, whereas the Caring motive is relatively well suited for Cooperative
settings.20
2.3. Insight 3: The responsiveness of motives to social settings depends on people’s patterns of dispositional traitsInter-individual personality differences may  be characterized as propensities to respond more or less to particular types
of incentives (Schultheiss and Brunstein, 2010). These dispositional traits can be genetically predetermined or develop
through very early life experiences (McClelland, 1965, 1985).21 Strong propensity to activate particular decisions is frequently
considered a personality trait (regarding prosocial behavior see McClintock and Allison, 1989; Van Lange et al., 1997; Balliet
et al., 2009).
16 See, for example Loewenstein et al. (1989), Andreoni (1990), Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000),
Charness and Rabin (2002), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007), or Cox et al. (2007).
17 Exceptions are made for variations in behavior due to non-systematic random mistakes (e.g. McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, 1998).
18 Framing effects and sensitivity to context are generally rationalized by behavioral economists as arising from conditionally cooperative preferences
(Fischbacher et al., 2001) and exogenous shifts in beliefs (see, e.g. Dufwenberg et al., 2011; Fosgaard et al., 2014).
19 This motive, which implicitly plays a major role in identity economics (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2010), could be included straightforwardly in our
analysis but, for brevity, we do not do so here. See also Holländer (1990), Bernheim (1994), Sugden (2000), Brekke et al. (2003), and Bénabou and Tirole
(2006)  for additional models of afﬁliation in economics.
20 The idea that social preferences ﬂourish in environments with strategic complements and are discouraged in environments with strategic substitutes
has  been discussed extensively in the literature studying the evolution of preferences (see, e.g. Rotemberg, 1994; Bester and Güth, 1998; Alger and Weibull,
2012). Experimental evidence that strategic complements encourage more cooperation than strategic substitutes may  be found in Suetens and Potters
(2007) and Potters and Suetens (2009).
21 According to the American Psychological Association, “personality refers to individual differences in characteristic patterns of thinking, feeling and
behaving (Kazdin, 2000).
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In our model, motives can be activated by a person’s social settings and the degree to which this happens is assumed to
epend on the person’s dispositional type.22 In practice, other aspects of the person’s internal and external environment can
lso activate motives. There is also much evidence that motives depend on interactions between situations and personality
haracteristics (see Mischel and Shoda, 1995; Roberts and Pomerantz, 2004).
As noted, our model distinguishes among three individual types: a Selﬁsh type (inducing an individual to behave selﬁshly
n all settings), a Caring type (inducing the individual to show concern for the interests of others in all settings, and a Respon-
ive type (inducing the individual to show concern for the interests of others when engaged in settings entailing Cooperative
nteractions and to behave selﬁshly when engaged in settings involving Competitive interactions). These distinctions are
erely an analytical simpliﬁcation of the common observation that people differ in terms of their dispositional traits and
hus have different motives under any given social setting.
.4. Insight 4: The frequencies of social contexts and their associated payoffs affect the evolution of individual types
In our model, different individual types are differentially suited for different social settings, depending on the payoffs to
ach types from these settings. It is in this sense that the ﬁtness of individual types depends on the frequency of the social
ettings to which people are exposed.
We will show that the Selﬁsh type is best-suited for people who encounter predominantly Competitive settings, but
oorly suited for the those who encounter more Cooperative settings. The Caring type will be shown to be best-suited
or people who encounter primarily Cooperative settings, but poorly suited for those who encounter more Competitive
ettings. Finally, the Responsive type is shown to be best for those who  encounter a more balanced mix  of both Cooperative
nd Competitive settings.
When the frequencies of social settings change, the relative ﬁtness of the various individual types changes as well. The
tness of these types is determined by the payoffs from the resulting motives in a given mix  of social settings. Therefore
hanges in the frequencies of social settings affect the relative payoffs to the various types. The higher the expected payoff
rom a particular type, the greater are the chances that this type will be reinforced. We  assume that individuals develop
ispositional types that yield the highest expected payoff. This stands in for a process of social evolution or personality
evelopment that may  take place over substantial periods of time, such as a lifespan or across generations.23
.5. Insight 5: Preferences are the outcome of a reﬂexive interplay between individual actions and social forces
Social settings inﬂuence people’s motives, which determine the objectives of their decisions (i.e. their preferences, in
erms of decision utilities). These decisions determine the payoffs from the social settings. People’s types inﬂuence their
otivational responsiveness to social settings; the resulting payoffs affect the evolution of individual types.
In short, preferences are not located exclusively in the individual, but rather emerge through the interaction between
ocial settings, dispositional types and motives. This phenomenon constitutes a fundamental form of reﬂexivity: social24
ettings provide a macro-foundation for microeconomic decisions, and these decisions provide a micro-foundation for the
ayoffs from the social settings.
Speciﬁcally, the social topography (the mapping of agents with different dispositional types into different social settings)
epends on agents’ relative payoffs from the Competitive versus Cooperative settings and their likelihoods of encountering
ach of these settings. However, since these payoffs depend on peoples’ motives, whose activation arises out of an interplay
etween the social setting and their dispositional types, the social topography feeds back into the micro-level through
einforcement of different dispositional types. The population-level distribution of dispositional types gravitates towards
n equilibrium in which people’s motives and the broader social topography are co-determined.
Insofar as an individual’s motives are inﬂuenced by both her social settings, preferences are not located exclusively in
he individual, as assumed in traditional economic theory (where the preference mapping is, as it were, hard-wired in the
erson’s brain).25 In practice, the endogenous relationships between preferences and environment can arise not only from
ocial settings, but also cultural norms and socialization, change-oriented social movements, or any number of other forces.
.6. Insight 6: Policies may  inﬂuence the evolution of cooperation in society by affecting the reﬂexive interplay between
ndividual decisions and social forcesOur analysis stands in sharp contrast to mainstream economic theory, according to which humans are assumed to be self-
nterested individuals, with rational preferences that are internally consistent, temporally stable and context-independent.
22 For an overview of how a person’s behavior depends on both their personality and the situation (for a review see Heckhausen and Heckhausen (2010,
hapter 4)).
23 Developmental psychologists have characterized personality traits as stable across settings, but plastic over the longer time scales of people’s lives
Baltes, 1987). Children are particularly inﬂuenced by the environment in which they develop (Bronfenbrenner, 1979).
24 This approach to reﬂexivity builds on seminal ideas by Soros (1988).
25 For a survey of endogenous preferences in economics, see Bowles (1998). For a defense of exogenous preferences in economics, see Stigler and Becker
1977).
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Fig. 1. Conceptual framework.
Under these standard assumptions, humans cooperate only in the presence of economic incentives. Problems such as the
provision of public goods and common resources are associated with deﬁcient incentives to take into account how one’s
decisions affect others. The desired interventions – such as taxes and subsidies, regulations, and redeﬁnitions of property
rights – are understood as compensating people for their effects on others or forcing people to act as if they were compensated.
We claim that in restricting its policy purview to incentives for self-interested, rational agents with exogenous prefer-
ences, traditional economic theory overlooks signiﬁcant sources of human cooperation. Beyond that, its policy prescriptions
may  even be counter-productive in some circumstances, since the proposed policies may  crowd out pro-social motives. Our
analysis addresses these deﬁciencies by investigating the inﬂuence of different social settings on the activation of different
motives. It thereby uncovers a much wider domain of policies than those identiﬁed in mainstream economic theory to
promote human cooperation in social dilemma situations.
In particular, policies can improve welfare not just by modifying agents’ incentives under a given set of preferences,
but also by affecting the preferences themselves by inﬂuencing their motives. Policies can shape people’s motives either
directly (by inﬂuencing the relative payoffs from different motives) or indirectly through the social settings in which people
participate. Such policies could include institutional, political, economic and social incentives, such as corporate culture,
regulations, payment schemes, and social norms. Over the long run, our analysis indicates another channel whereby policy
can affect welfare, namely, through inﬂuence on dispositional traits. Changes in the frequencies of and payoffs from social
settings affect the relative expected payoffs from different dispositional types and thereby inﬂuence the prevalence of these
dispositional types. In turn, changes in the distribution of dispositional types over the population affect the responsiveness
of motives to social settings. The resulting changes in motives affect the contributions to and payoffs from the social settings,
thereby affecting agents’ wellbeing.
In general, people’s willingness to cooperate in the presence of social dilemmas may  be inﬂuenced both by the standard
pecuniary incentives of mainstream economics and by the motivation-shaping policies above. Whether pecuniary incentives
complement or crowd out pro-social motivation – and hence enhance or reduce the effectiveness of motivation-shaping
policies – depends on the social setting and the composition of dispositional types in the population. In particular, when
pecuniary incentives based on individual performance are used to elicit pro-social behavior in the settings where strategic
complements apply, these incentives can work against people’s intrinsic motivation to cooperate. Because these policies help
the selﬁshly motivated more than they help those with pro-social motives, they reinforce the prevalence of dispositional
types that predispose people to selﬁshness. The desirability of such policies is therefore ambiguous. Our results provide
structural foundations for what Bowles (1998, 2008) documents as the tendency for markets and complete contracts to
crowd out voluntarily cooperative behavior and social exchange.
Where incentives are used to support pro-social behavior in settings where strategic substitutes apply however, they
bolster people’s motivation to consider others’ wellbeing. In these settings incentives deter exploitation of cooperative
people by the selﬁsh, and therefore relatively advantage those with pro-social motives. This reinforces the prevalence of
dispositional types predisposing people to pro-sociality and ampliﬁes the effect of the pecuniary incentives.
These considerations are relevant for the policy approaches to a wide variety of economic problems, ranging from climate
change, pollution and biodiversity loss to insufﬁcient rates of vaccination, organ and blood donation, to efforts to eradicate
poverty. In all these cases, individual contributions to public goods or poverty reduction may  depend signiﬁcantly on their
underlying motives and these may  be shaped by the social settings in which they are embedded.
This framework of thought is summarized in Fig. 1. Social settings create interpersonal relations that generate comple-
mentarities or substitutabilities in the participants’ actions. These settings affect each participant’s motives. The motivational
response to the social settings is modulated through each participant’s dispositional type. The motives generate behavior pat-
terns that generate payoffs to the participants. These payoffs, in turn, affect the development of the participants’ dispositional
types.26
26 It is reasonable to expect that the distribution of social settings may endogenously depend on the distribution of dispositional types in the population.
For  example a society comprised entirely of those with caring dispositional types may  be rather disinterested competitive settings. Our model abstracts
from  this channel to focus on the causal effect that the distribution of various settings has on motives and dispositional types.
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. Motives and social settings
Our model has the following building blocks:
Two motives: Self-interested Wanting (s) and Caring (c): Under Self-interested Wanting, an agent is concerned only with
her own direct payoff; whereas under the Caring motive, the agent is also concerned with the direct payoff of another
agent (at least to some degree).
Two kinds of social setting: Cooperative (C) and Competitive (K). In the Cooperative setting, an agent’s direct payoff
depends positively on another agent’s contribution to the social interaction. In the Competitive setting, an agent’s direct
payoff depends negatively on another agent’s contribution to the social interaction. For simplicity, we  assume that these
social interactions are dyadic, i.e. an agent i interacts with another agent j.
Each agent i encounters a Cooperative setting with probability i ∈ [0, 1] and encounters a Competitive setting with
probability 1 − i. This probability is idiosyncratic and distributed in the population according to the commonly known
cumulative distribution function H ( · ).
Three kinds of agent: Selﬁsh (s), Caring (c) and Responsive (r) agents. Selﬁsh agents always pursue the Self-interested
Wanting motive; Caring agents always pursue the Caring motive; and Responsive agents pursue the motive that is most
appropriate to the setting (in terms of payoff).27
We  normalize the number of all agents in the population to be 1. Deﬁne the frequencies of Caring, Selﬁsh and Responsive
agents as nc, ns, and nr, respectively:28
o begin with, we will focus exclusively on the Selﬁsh and Caring agents. Responsive agents will be considered later.
.1. Distinguishing social settings through strategic complements and substitutes
Whether or not one’s cooperation makes someone else want to cooperate is essential to understanding the strategic
onsiderations and resulting patterns of cooperation in social dilemmas. Any social dilemma may  be characterized as hav-
ng strategic complements, substitutes, or neither – and the well-known social dilemmas are easily classiﬁed within this
ramework. Social dilemmas exhibiting strategic complementarities include collaboration in teams and common goods
ith increasing marginal utility. In contrast, contests and common goods with diminishing marginal utility exhibit strategic
ubstitutes.
Collaboration in teams often involves workers whose inputs are complementary. For example suppose two academics,
ne with theoretical and another with empirical expertise, decide to collaborate on an article. If the theoretician puts in
ow effort, then the empiricist’s time may  be better spent on other projects, but if the theoretician puts in high effort then
he empiricist’s effort becomes much more productive since a high-impact publication may  require both a high-quality
heoretical and empirical contribution. Cooperation in teams motivates Rotemberg’s (1994) analysis of workplace relations.
e shows that altruism may  be a rational way to “commit” oneself to high effort in these circumstances. Another example
s open-source software. Individual programmers work on pieces of code that are then contributed to larger projects. Any
ne person’s code may  be useless without the code that others have contributed.
The other prominent instance of cooperation problems with strategic complementarities involves common (non-
xcludable) goods with increasing marginal utility. In these cases contributing to the common good is most efﬁcient when
 high level of provision is expected.29 When the anticipated level of the common good is low, contributing may  be very
nproductive. Examples include common pool resources near their level of extinction or public goods such as transportation
one road may  be rather useless without a larger network) or public broadcasting (only well-produced programs may be
orth supporting).
Contests are a paradigmatic example of a social dilemma with strategic substitutes. These can include auctions and
otteries (which may  be used to ﬁnance public goods)30 and tournaments (which may  be used in labor contracts, see Lazear
nd Rosen, 1981). The deﬁning feature of a contest is that many people will engage in costly effort or payment and the
ne(s) who take the most costly action will obtain the best (expected) distribution of resources or status. Because reducing
ne’s effort in a contest increases the likelihood that others win (holding their effort constant), this means that the expected
arginal utility of others’ effort is diminishing in own effort (see Dubey et al., 2006 for a formal proof of this result).
The other major type of social dilemma with strategic substitutes are common goods with diminishing marginal utility.
ince contributions are less efﬁcient at high levels of provision, people will want to reduce their contributions when they
hink that others are providing the common good. This is most starkly illustrated in a volunteer’s dilemma. When only one
erson is required to stop and help a stranded motorist, people will tend to drive on if they think that someone else will
27 Since there is a one-to-one mapping between the motives of Self-interested Wanting and Care (on the one hand) and the Selﬁsh and Caring dispositional
ypes  (on the other), these motives and dispositional types can both be associated with the same descriptors: s and c, respectively.
28 All agents in the population must be one of these three types.
29 Harstad and Liski (2013) illustrate formally how optimal contributions to common goods depend on the slope of their marginal utility.
30 See Morgan (2000) for lotteries and Goeree et al. (2005) for auctions.
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help, and stop if they think that no one will. Traditional air pollutants also display this property for example, since low
concentrations of pollutants may  be relatively harmless.
3.2. Direct payoffs and utilities
Deﬁne xi and xj as the contributions of agents i and j, respectively, to the social interaction in the Cooperative setting. Let
agent i’s direct payoff from the interaction with agent j in the Cooperative setting be
Uij ≡ xixj + aCxi + bCxj −
dC
2
x2i , (1)
where aC, bC > 0 and dC > 2 are constants.
Deﬁne yi and yj as the contributions of agents i and j, respectively, to the social interaction in the Competitive setting.
Furthermore, let agent i’s direct payoff to the interaction with agent j in the Competitive setting be
Vij ≡ −yiyj + aKyi − bKyj −
dK
2
y2i , (2)
where aK, bK > 0 and dK > 2 are constants.
Under the motive of Self-Interested Wanting (s), agent i’s utility from each of the two social settings is equal to the direct
payoffs from these settings (Us
ij
and Vs
ij
, respectively):
Us
ij
= Uij,
Vs
ij
= Vij.
But under the motive of Caring (c), agent i’s utility from each of the social settings is equal to a convex combination of
the direct payoffs to agents i and j:
Uc
ij
= (1 − )Uij + Uji,
Vc
ij
= (1 − )Vij + Vji,
where  is a positive constant, 0 <  ≤ 1/2. At one extreme,  = 0 represents pure Self-interest, whereas  = 1/2 represents
“Perfect Care” (i.e. one’s own payoff is weighted equally with the payoff of one’s partner).
3.3. Equilibrium contributions and equilibrium payoffs
To ﬁnd agent i’s utility-maximizing contribution to the social interaction in the Cooperative setting under the Self-
interested Wanting motive (s), we maximize the utility Us
ij
= Uij with respect xij:
xsi =
aC + xj
dC
. (3)
Similarly, agent i’s optimal contribution to the interaction in the Competitive setting under the Self-interested Wanting
motive is the contribution yij which maximizes the utility Vsij = Vij:
ysi =
aK − yj
dK
. (4)
With regard to the Caring motive (c), agent i’s optimal contribution xij to the interaction in the Cooperative setting
maximizes the utility Uc
ij
= (1  − )Uij + Uji:
xci =
(1 − ) aC + bC + xj
(1 − )dC
, (5)
and agent i’s optimal contribution to the interaction in the Competitive setting maximizes the utility Vc
ij
= (1 − )Vij + Vji:yc = (1  − ) aK − bK − yj
(1 − )dK
. (6)
Note that each contribution of agent i depends on the contribution made by agent j. Of course, agent j is in the same
position as agent i, and thus the equilibrium contributions may  be derived once we  know what the motives of these two
agents are. In the social settings above, the Caring agent is assumed to pursue only the Caring motive, while the Selﬁsh agent
is assumed to pursue only the Self-interested Wanting motive. Thus, for example, when two Selﬁsh agents are paired in the
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Table  1
Agents’ contributions to the interactions in each social setting.
Other’s motive
Self-interest (s) motive Caring (c) motive
Own  motive Cooperative (C) setting
s xss = aC
dC −1 x
sc = (1−)(dC +1)aC +bC
(1−)d2
C
−1
c xcs = ((1−)dC +1)aC +bC dC
(1−)d2
C
−1 x
cc = (1−)aC +bC(1−)dC −1
Competitive (K) setting
s  yss = aK
dK +1 y
sc = (1−)(dK −1)aK +bK
(1−)d2
K
−1
c ycs = ((1−)dK −1)aK −bK dK
(1−)d2
K
−1 y
cc = (1−)aK −bK(1−)dK +1
Table 2
Agents’ payoffs in the social settings.
Other’s motive
Self-interested Wanting (s) motive Caring (c) motive
Own  motive Cooperative (C) setting
s  Uss = aC (aC dC +2bC (dC −1))
2(dC −1)
2 U
sc = Uss +
dC
(
2(1−)d2
C
+−2
)
(aC +bC (dC −1))
2
2(dC −1)
2
(
(1−1)d2
C
−1
)2
c Ucs = Ucc −

(
dC
(
2(1−)3d2
C
−2(1−)dC +3−2
)
+2
)
(aC +bC (dC −1))
2
2((1−)dC −1)
2
(
(1−)d2
C
−1
)2 Ucc = ((1−)aC +bC )(aC ((1−)dC −2)−bC ((3−2)dC −2+2))
2((1−)dC −1)
2
Competitive (K) setting
s  Vss = aK (aK dK −2bK (dK +1))
2(dK +1)2
Vsc = Vss +
dK
(
2(1−)d2
K
+−2
)
(aK +bK (dK +1))2
2(dK +1)2
(
(1−)d2
K
−1
)2( ( ( ) ) )
C
T
w
a
t
a
C
b
i
G
A
c
t
sc Vcs = Vcc −
 dK 2(1−)dK (1−)2dK + +3−2 −2 (aK +bK (dK +1))2
2((1−)dK +1)2
(
(1−)d2
K
−1
)2 Vcc = ((1−)aK −bK )(aK dK −aK (dK −2)−bK ((2−3)dK −2+2))2((1−)dK +1)2
ooperative setting, each agent contributes the amount in Eq. (3), where xs
i
= xs
j
. Substituting xs
i
= xs
j
into Eq. (3), we  obtain31
xsi =
aC
dC − 1
.
Performing such calculations for all possible pairings in both types of social setting, we  obtain the contributions in Table 1.
able 2 shows the resulting payoffs from each pairing of motives.
Under the assumption that
0 <  <
2
(
d2C − 1
)
2
(
d2C − dC
)
+ d3C
, (7)
e ﬁnd that32
Uss < Ucs < Usc < Ucc. (8)
In words, for the Cooperative settings, the highest utility is achieved when two  Caring agents are paired, since both
gents are concerned with each other’s welfare and consequently internalize, at least partially, the externality arising from
he complementarity of their social interaction. The second highest utility goes to a Selﬁsh agent who  is paired with a Caring
gent, because the Selﬁsh agent can take advantage of the Caring agent’s concern. The third highest utility is achieved by a
aring agent who is paired with a Selﬁsh agent, since the Caring agent exerts modest effort on behalf of the Selﬁsh agent
ut gets only low effort in return. Finally, the lowest payoff is achieved when two Selﬁsh agents are paired. Neither of them
nternalizes the externality arising from the complementarity of their interaction.
31 Note that throughout we assume that agents can observe each other’s motives. While this assumption is admittedly unrealistic, Frank (1988) and
uttmann (2013) among others have argued that people frequently make superﬁcial but informative judgments about the motives of other people.
ssuming that types are only partially observable does not change the qualitative result that social preferences can be beneﬁcial in settings where strategic
omplements apply (Bester and Güth, 1998; Guttmann, 2013). The ongoing nature of social interactions and people’s ability to build reputations makes
hese  assumptions closer to being satisﬁed.
32 Following the logic of Bester and Güth (1998), the highest  that can be supported in a population consisting of only altruists (and only cooperative
ettings) is 1/c < 2(d2
C
− 1)/(2(d2
C
− dC ) + d3C ).
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Table  3
Payoffs of all agents in the social settings.
Other’s dispositional type
s r c s r c
Own dispositional type Coop. (C) setting Comp. (K) setting
s  Uss Usc Usc Vss Vss Vsc
r Ucs −  Ucc −  Ucc −  Vss −  Vss −  Vsc − 
c  Ucs Ucc Ucc Vcs Vcs Vcc
Furthermore, under the assumptions (7), we  also ﬁnd that
Vcs < Vss < Vcc < Vsc. (9)
For the Competitive setting, the highest utility is achieved by a Selﬁsh agent when paired with a Caring agent, since the
Selﬁsh agent beneﬁts both from her own selﬁshness and the altruism of the partner. The second highest utility is achieved
when two Caring agents are paired, since each internalizes the Competitive externality to the other (at least partially). The
third highest utility is achieved when two Selﬁsh agents are paired, since neither of them internalizes this externality. Finally,
the lowest utility is achieved by a Caring agent when paired with a Selﬁsh agent, since the Caring agent suffers both from
her own (partial) selﬂessness and the selﬁshness of the partner.
These results enable us to specify the contributions and utilities of the Responsive agents in both social settings. Observe
that Cooperative settings tend to favor the survival of Caring agents, while Competitive settings rather tend to favor the
survival of Selﬁsh agents.33 In line with our conception of multi-directedness above, we  suppose that Responsive agents
employ the Caring motive in Cooperative settings and the Self-interested Wanting motive in Competitive settings.34 For
this purpose, Responsive agents need to distinguish Cooperative from Competitive settings and adjust appropriately. We
assume that such assessments and adjustments are not costless. In particular, Responsive agents are assumed to be subject
to random mistakes in assessing their social context. For simplicity, let the expected cost of these mistakes in each period of
analysis be , a positive constant. Then the utilities of the Responsive agent, alongside those of the Selﬁsh and Caring agents,
in the two social settings are given by Table 3.
4. The reinforcement of dispositional types
We  now consider the reinforcement of different dispositional types. We assume, as noted, that agents tend to develop
those types for which they experience the highest expected payoffs. These payoffs depend on the probabilities with which
they will encounter the Cooperative and Competitive settings, and the probabilities with which they encounter the dis-
positional types of others in those settings. As we have seen, the Caring type has a comparative advantage in Cooperative
settings, whereas the Selﬁsh type has a comparative advantage in Competitive settings. Responsive types are not best-suited
for either setting – on account of the ﬂexibility cost  – but they are better suited for Cooperative settings than Selﬁsh agents,
and better suited for Competitive settings than Caring agents.
Furthermore, within each type of setting, an individual does better if she meets another agent with the Caring motive than
if she meets another agent with the Self-interested Wanting motive. That is, in Cooperative settings expected payoffs will
depend on the relative proportion of Selﬁsh agents (who have the Self-interested Wanting motive) compared to Responsive
or Caring agents (who have the Caring motive); and in Competitive settings expected payoffs will depend on the relative
proportion of Caring agents (who have the Caring motive) compared to Responsive or Selﬁsh agents (who have the Self-
interested Wanting motive). In this way, we may  focus on two  probabilities: the likelihood of encountering a selﬁsh agent
in a Cooperative setting, denoted by pCs , and the likelihood of encountering a Caring agent in a Competitive setting, denoted
pKc .
Therefore the expected payoff from developing the Caring type (c), conditional on the agent’s probability i of encoun-
tering a Cooperative setting, is
˘ci ≡ i ·
((
1 − pCs
)
Ucc + pCs Ucs
)
+ (1 − i) ·
(
pKc V
cc +
(
1 − pKc
)
Vcs
)
. (10)
In words, the Caring agent’s expected payoff in a Cooperative setting is the payoff from meeting another Care-motivated
agent (Ucc) times the likelihood of meeting a Care-motivated agent (1 − pCs ), plus the payoff from meeting a Self-interested
Wanting-motivated agent (Ucs) times the likelihood of meeting the latter agent (pCs ). The Caring agent’s expected payoff in a
Competitive setting is the payoff from meeting another Care-motivated agent (Vcc) times the likelihood of meeting a Care-
motivated agent (pKc ), plus the payoff from meeting a Self-interested Wanting-motivated agent (V
cs) times the likelihood
33 For a thorough treatment of this argument see Bester and Güth (1998).
34 We do not interpret this as deliberately opportunistic behavior. Rather, each setting may be thought of as being associated environmental stimuli and
cues.  These stimuli may  activate different decision-making processes. Convergent evidence from psychology and neuroscience supports the notion that
humans’ affect, thought patterns, perceptual sensitivity, and autonomic measures can change across contexts in ways that affect their decisions (Przyrembel
et  al., mimeo).
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f meeting the latter agent (1 − pKc ). Since this agent encounters Cooperative settings with probability i and Competitive
ettings with probability 1 − i, each of the expected interaction payoffs is multiplied by the appropriate probability of that
etting type.
The expected payoff from developing the Responsive type (r) is
˘ri ≡ i ·
((
1 − pCs
)
Ucc + pCs Ucs
)
+ (1 − i) ·
(
pKc V
sc +
(
1 − pKc
)
Vss
)
− . (11)
In words, the Responsive agent’s expected payoff in a Cooperative setting is the payoff from meeting another Care-
otivated agent (Ucc) times the likelihood of meeting a Care-motivated agent (1 − pCs ), plus the payoff from meeting a
elf-interested Wanting-motivated agent (Ucs) times the likelihood of meeting the latter agent (pCs ). The Responsive agent’s
xpected payoff in a Competitive setting is the payoff from meeting a Care-motivated agent (Vsc) times the likelihood
f meeting a Care-motivated agent (pKc ), plus the payoff from meeting another Self-interested Wanting agent (V
ss) times
he likelihood of meeting the latter agent (1 − pKc ). Since this agent encounters Cooperative settings with probability i
nd Competitive settings with probability 1 − i, each of the expected interaction payoffs is multiplied by the appropriate
robability of that setting type. Note that the r dispositional type achieves the highest interaction payoffs in both the C and
 settings, but also faces ﬂexibility cost .
The expected payoff from developing the Selﬁsh dispositional type (s) is
˘si ≡ i ·
((
1 − pCs
)
Usc + pCs Uss
)
+ (1 − i) ·
(
pKc V
sc +
(
1 − pKc
)
Vss
)
. (12)
In words, the Selﬁsh agent’s expected payoff in a Cooperative setting is the payoff from meeting a Care-motivated agent
Usc) times the likelihood of meeting a Care-motivated agent (1 − pCs ), plus the payoff from meeting another Self-interested
anting-motivated agent (Uss) times the likelihood of meeting the latter agent (pCs ). The Selﬁsh agent’s expected payoff in a
ompetitive setting is the payoff from meeting a Care-motivated agent (Vsc) times the likelihood of meeting a Care-motivated
gent (pKc ), plus the payoff from meeting another Self-interested Wanting-motivated agent (V
ss) times the likelihood of
eeting the latter agent (1 − pKc ). Since this agent encounters Cooperative settings with probability i and Competitive
ettings with probability 1 − i, each of the expected interaction payoffs is multiplied by the appropriate probability of that
etting type.
An agent will develop the c dispositional type rather than the r dispositional type when ˘c
i
> ˘r
i
. This implicitly deﬁnes
 threshold  = c above which individuals develop the c dispositional type and below which individuals develop the r
ispositional type. Intuitively, this means that if agents are sufﬁciently specialized in Cooperative settings, they do not
evelop the ﬂexible r dispositional type because the opportunity cost of employing the Caring motive in Competitive sett-
ngs, pKc (V
sc − Vcc) + (1 − pKc )(Vss − Vcs), does not justify the ﬂexibility cost . Agents who will not be overly specialized in
ooperative settings will suffer the ﬂexibility cost and develop the r dispositional type.
Likewise, an agent develops the s dispositional type over the r dispositional type when ˘s
i
> ˘r
i
. This implicitly deﬁnes
 threshold  = s below which individuals develop the s dispositional type and above which individuals develop the r
ispositional type. Intuitively, this means that if agents are sufﬁciently specialized in Competitive settings, they do not
evelop the ﬂexible r dispositional type because the opportunity cost of employing the Self-interested Wanting motive in
ooperative settings, (1 − pCs )(Ucc − Usc) + pCs (Ucs − Uss), does not justify the ﬂexibility cost . Agents who  will not be overly
pecialized in Competitive settings will suffer this cost and develop the r dispositional type.
Solving ˘c
i
= ˘r
i
for 1 − c, we ﬁnd that
1 − c = 
pKc (Vsc − Vcc) +
(
1 − pKc
)
(Vss − Vcs)
, (13)
eaning the share of Caring agents will depend on the ratio of the ﬂexibility cost to the opportunity cost of forgoing high
ompetitive-setting payoffs.
Likewise, solving ˘s
i
= ˘r
i
for s, we ﬁnd that
s = (
1 − pCs
)
(Ucc − Usc) +  pCs (Ucs − Uss)
, (14)
eaning the share of Selﬁsh agents will depend on the ratio of the ﬂexibility cost to the opportunity cost of forgoing high
ooperative-setting payoffs.
In order to ensure that there are positive fractions of both Caring and Selﬁsh dispositional types, we assume that
0 <  < min
{
Ucs − Uss, Vsc − Vcc, Vss − Vcs
}
. (15)
Intuitively, we must assume a positive ﬂexibility cost  > 0 because at  = 0 any individual would be able to employ the
est-suited motive in any setting, regardless of how infrequently she encountered each type of setting. To assume that
eople are able to shift their motives to suit very unfamiliar situations seems psychologically implausible however. For
ven arbitrarily low ﬂexibility costs  > 0 however, there will exist people with sufﬁciently high likelihoods of encountering
ooperative (Competitive) settings that they develop Caring (Selﬁsh) rather than Responsive dispositional type. Conversely,
o ensure that there are some Responsive types in the population, we  must assume that the ﬂexibility cost does not exceed
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the opportunity cost of employing the less-suited motivation to a particular setting. That is, the cost of being able to switch
motives should be less than the gain from being able to switch motives.
Having identiﬁed the cutoffs c and s, the number of agents who develop each dispositional type is determined by the
distribution H of . Speciﬁcally,
nc = 1 − H
(
c
)
, nr = H
(
c
)
− H
(
s
)
and ns = H
(
s
)
.
5. The social topography
5.1. Social opportunities
We  now consider the likelihood of encountering agents of each dispositional type in the Cooperative versus Compet-
itive settings. Depending on the relative probabilities of the Cooperative and Competitive setting – a phenomenon that
depends on an individual’s parameter i – agents of all dispositional types will encounter both social settings under different
circumstances.35 Recall that  is distributed according to H ( · ) with mean  ∈ (0, 1) and density H ( · ).
The probability that an agent encountering a Cooperative setting has the s dispositional type, pCs , may  be expressed using
Bayes’ rule:
pCs = P (s | C) =
P (C | s) · ns
P (C)
= E (i | s) · H (
s)

.
We may  express the conditional expectation E (i | s) by
E (i | s) =
∫ s
0
t · h (t)dt
H (s)
,
as it is the mean of a truncated distribution. Therefore, we have
pCs =
1

∫ s
0
t · h (t)dt, (16)
which we term the social opportunities function for Cooperative settings. This represents the chance that an individual in a
Cooperative setting has to ﬁnd a Care-motivated partner, which has implications for how fruitful their interactions will be.
Intuitively, since we need to know the likelihood of encountering a Self-interested agent in a Cooperative setting, we must
take into account the total number of agents with the Selﬁsh dispositional type (ns = H (s)); but then we  must also account
for the fact that those who have developed the Selﬁsh dispositional type are those least likely to encounter Cooperative
settings (i.e. we must know E (i | s)). To derive the conditional (expected) likelihood of encountering a Cooperative setting
for these types, we must integrate over the relevant support of the density of , speciﬁcally over those values of  less than
s since only those agents will have developed the Selﬁsh dispositional type. Finally, we must divide by the total likelihood
of encountering a Cooperative setting , the probability of the conditioning event.
Likewise, the probability that an agent encountering a Competitive setting has the c dispositional type, pKc , is
pKc = P (c  | K) =
P (K | c) · nc
P (K)
= (1  − E (i | c)) · (1 − H (
c))
1 −  .
Substituting in the expression for the conditional expectation, we get
pKc =
nc −
∫ 1
c
t · h (t)dt
1 −  , (17)
which we term the social opportunities function for Competitive settings. This represents the chance that an individual in a
Cooperative setting has to ﬁnd a Care-motivated partner, which has implications for how fruitful their interactions will
be. Intuitively, since we  need to know the likelihood of encountering a Care-motivated agent in a Competitive setting, we
must take into account the total number of agents with the Caring dispositional type (nc = 1 − H (c)); but then we must
also account for the fact that those who have developed the Caring dispositional type are those least likely to encounter
Competitive settings (i.e. we must know 1 − E (i | c)). To derive the conditional (expected) likelihood of encountering a
Competitive setting for these types, we must integrate over the relevant support of the density of , speciﬁcally over those
values of  greater than c since only those agents will have developed the Caring dispositional type. Finally, we  must divide
by the total likelihood of encountering a Competitive setting 1 − , the probability of the conditioning event.
35 We assume here that the distribution H ( · ) of  has no mass at either 0 or 1.
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Fig. 2. Determination of the equilibrium level for the Selﬁsh dispositional type under uniform (left) and more exotic distributions of cooperative settings
(right,  stable equilibria indicated).
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cig. 3. Determination of the equilibrium level for the Caring dispositional type – note that the ﬁtness of the Caring dispositional type may  be decreasing
n  the number of other caring agents if exploiting these agents is sufﬁciently proﬁtable.
.2. Equilibrium social topography
We  are now able to characterize how the social topography is determined in equilibrium. Recall that the cutoffs determin-
ng the number of agents developing each dispositional type (Eqs. (13) and (14)) depend on the likelihood of encountering
are-motivated and Self-interested Wanting motivated agents in the Competitive and Cooperative setting, respectively.
ince these equations captured the social forces acting on dispositional type development, they may  be represented by
disposition development” curves. The likelihoods of encountering each type of agent may  be represented by “social oppor-
unities” curves (Eqs. (16) and (17)), which in turn depend on the total shares of each type of agent in the population. The
quilibrium is characterized by the intersection of these two  curves. Because the probabilities pKc and p
C
s are continuous
nto36 the unit interval, we may  invoke the Brouwer ﬁxed point theorem to claim that such an equilibrium exists.
Graphically, this equilibrium can be visualized in Figs. 2 and 3. The horizontal axis measures the probability of encoun-
ering an s agent in a Cooperative setting, while the vertical axis corresponds with the share of the population adopting the
 dispositional type. Recall that in Section 4 we derived the shares of the population developing the s dispositional type as
 function of the likelihood of encountering others with the s dispositional type in a Cooperative setting. This “disposition
evelopment” curve was based on a comparison of the relative payoffs between s and r agents in the Cooperative social
etting because these two dispositional types behaved equivalently in Competitive settings. On the graph, we see that the
hare of the population developing the s dispositional type (driving the evolution of dispositional types in the population,
easured on the vertical axis) is increasing in the likelihood of meeting another s-dispositional type agent in a Cooperative
etting (measured on the horizontal axis).
Recall also that in Section 5.1, we derived the likelihood of encountering an s-dispositional type agent in the Cooperative
etting based on the total share of s agents in the population. This was based on a straightforward application of Bayes’ rule.
his “social opportunities” curve indicates that the likelihood of meeting another s-dispositional type agent (describing the
ocial opportunities facing the agents, measured on horizontal axis) is increasing in the share of the population developing
he s dispositional type (i.e. if there are more of them, you are more likely to run into one).
At the equilibrium, lying at the intersection between the disposition development curve and the social opportunities
urve, the share of the population adopting the s dispositional type (which is increasing in the likelihood of meeting
36 Clearly, if the share of the population developing the selﬁsh dispositional type is zero, then the likelihood of encountering a selﬁshly-motivated person
n  the cooperative setting will be zero as well. Likewise, if all agents have the selﬁsh dispositional type, the probability of encountering this trait in the
ooperative setting will be 1.
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another s-dispositional type) is consistent with the actual probability of encountering an s agent as determined by the
social opportunities function for Cooperative settings. Note that the social opportunities curve intersects the origin, and the
point
(
pCs = 1, s = 1
)
, while the disposition development curve lies strictly between 0 and 1 for appropriate restrictions on
 (see previous section). Based on these restrictions we know that the two  curves must cross at a point in the interior of the
interval.37
Since the social opportunities curve depends on the shape of H ( · ) however, it is possible that for sufﬁciently “non-
uniform” distributions, this curve may  intersect the disposition development curve more than once, meaning that multiple
social topography equilibria could exist.38 In the case where multiple equilibrium social topographies are possible, there
will be at least one unstable equilibrium, plus another stable one. To understand the stability of the equilibrium, it is
sufﬁcient to consider whether the disposition development curve intersects the social opportunities curve from above
or below. When the disposition development curve lies above the social opportunities curve, this means that a greater
share of the population could proﬁtably develop the Selﬁsh dispositional type than currently have this dispositional type,
which puts upward pressure on the share of Selﬁsh agents; whereas if the disposition development curve lies below the
social opportunities curve there are too many Selﬁsh agents than could proﬁt by developing this dispositional type, putting
downward pressure on the share of Selﬁsh agents. Therefore when the disposition development curve intersects the social
opportunities curve from above the equilibrium is stable, while when the disposition development curve intersects the
social opportunities curve from below, the resulting equilibrium is unstable (i.e. if there were slightly more Selﬁsh agents,
more agents would want to be Selﬁsh and vice-versa). We  consider the possibility of multiple equilibria intriguing, as “big
pushes” to promote more cooperation may  be possible. However, we focus on cases of unique equilibria for policy evaluation
purposes.39
The equilibrium number of Caring dispositional types is likewise determined by the intersection of the c-disposition
development curve and the likelihood of encountering a c-dispositional type in a Competitive setting. Similar considerations
for the equilibrium share of s agents apply here as well, with the additional possibility that the number of agents developing
the Caring dispositional type may  be either increasing or decreasing in the share of other Caring agents, depending on
how easy they are to exploit. When Vcc + Vss > Vcs + Vsc, the prevalence of other Caring agents increases the advantage of
this dispositional type (as they can interact with each other more). However, if Vcc + Vss < Vcs + Vsc, any increase in Caring
dispositional types beneﬁts the selﬁshly-motivated by more, since these agents become very proﬁtable to exploit40 (see
right panel of Fig. 3).
6. Policies to promote cooperation
Could policies that promote more cooperative social settings lead to the evolution of a more caring society? In our model,
a more caring society may  be represented by a rise in the number of Caring and Responsive agents engaging in caring
interactions with others.
In this section we consider three policy exercises. First, we  analyze the effects of an increase in the prevalence of coopera-
tive social settings, encouraging the development of more cooperative dispositional types. Various policies, such as incentives
and institutions that discourage anti-social behavior, can serve this purpose.41
Second, we consider pecuniary incentives aimed at promoting cooperation. In this context, we  shed light on the conditions
under which such incentives “crowd-in” or “crowd-out” social preferences.42
And ﬁnally, we examine policies promoting internal change favoring prosociality in the individual. In particular, we
consider the effects of mental training that enables the recipients to derive an additional utility gain from being cooperative.
This policy involves training the individual to experience more gratiﬁcation from care, as distinct from policies that change
the prevalence of cooperative settings or change the pecuniary incentives to promote cooperation.
37 In principle, corner point equilibria in which the entire population develops one dispositional type are possible, provided that we consider extreme
assumptions on the ﬂexibility cost . For  = 0, all agents would develop the Responsive dispositional type while for  very large no agents would develop
this  dispositional type.
38 It is easy to verify that for H ( · ) uniform, the social opportunities curve is convex on the entire unit interval. Note that ∂pCs /∂s = s · h (s)/ and
∂
2
pCs /∂(
s)2 = (h (s) + sh′ (s))/.
39 None of the results of our policy evaluations will depend on which (stable) equilibrium is selected.
40 Under such parameterizations a marginal increase in the share of the population with the Caring dispositional type beneﬁts the self-interested more
than  the Care-motivated in competitive settings. Or rather the gain from a Self-interested agent ﬁnding a caring rather than Self-interested partner to
exploit  is greater than the gain from a care-motivated agent ﬁnding another care-motivated agent to cooperate with.
41 As plasticity is largest in childhood, it may be desirable to structure education environments to encourage teamwork from an early age. Further-
more,  since research has shown dispositional traits to exhibit some ﬂexibility even into adulthood, social environments could be adapted through choice
architecture and institutional design to foster cooperation.
42 See Bowles and Polanía-Reyes (2012) for a comprehensive review. Numerous contributions explain why pecuniary incentives may undermine people’s
intrinsic motivations to act in the common interest (Titmuss, 1970; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Sandel, 2012; Bowles, 2008). Arguments for
this  proposition range from people’s need for self-determination (Deci and Ryan) to image concerns (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006) to displacing social norms
(Sliwka, 2007) to framing decisions differently (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), and by working to change people’s preferences (Bowles, 1998).
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.1. Welfare framework
We  consider welfare W in terms of the sum of the expected payoffs from the Cooperative and Competitive settings,
espectively, each weighted by the share of the population that encounters each setting.43 Any potential policy changes
ithin our framework can then be decomposed into how they affect the payoffs in the social setting holding the distribution
f dispositional types ﬁxed (static efﬁciency), and how these policy changes inﬂuence the distribution of dispositional types
n the population:
dW = ∂W + ∂W
∂pCs
· dpCs +
∂W
∂pKc
· dpKc . (18)
.2. Promotion of Cooperative settings
As our ﬁrst policy exercise, we consider shifting the distribution of Cooperative relative to Competitive settings. In
articular, we examine the effects of an increase in the average share of the population that encounters Cooperative settings,
.
Changes in static efﬁciency depend on the difference in expected payoffs between Cooperative and Competitive settings.
uch static analysis suggests that increasing the prevalence of Cooperative settings is only worthwhile when they are more
roductive than Competitive settings. As shown below, however, this may  be mistaken in a dynamic context.
An increase in the share of cooperative settings would have a direct impact on the social opportunities curves, both in
ooperative and Competitive settings. Recall that in Eqs. (16) and (17), the likelihood pCs of encountering an s-dispositional
ype in the Cooperative setting was decreasing in , while the likelihood of encountering a c-dispositional type in the
ompetitive setting was increasing in . Using our equilibrium graphs, we can see that when the social opportunities curve
hifts up in the Cooperative setting, it intersects the disposition development curve at a lower share of Selﬁsh dispositional
ypes (Fig. 4, left panel). Similarly, when the social opportunities curve shifts down in the Competitive setting, it intersects
he disposition development curve at a higher share of Caring dispositional types (Fig. 4, right panel).
Intuitively, here the increase in Cooperative settings changes where the marginal types lie in the overall distribution.
ome people who would have been selﬁsh may  now develop the responsive dispositional type since their likelihood of
ncountering a Cooperative setting goes up, and some people who would have been responsive types may  now develop
he caring dispositional type since their likelihood of encountering a Competitive setting goes down. Since overall welfare
s decreasing in pCs and increasing in p
K
c , this policy has beneﬁcial second-order effects that go beyond considerations of
hether Cooperative settings are more productive than Competitive settings.
.3. Pecuniary incentives
Let us now consider how pecuniary incentives – taxes on Competitive activities and subsidies for Cooperative activities
 affect the evolution of cooperation. We  will show that when pecuniary incentives increase the payoffs to those with
aring dispositional type relative to those with Selﬁsh dispositional type, that incentives support the development of that
ispositional type and crowd in voluntary cooperation. Such policies work by discouraging exploitation of the cooperative
y the selﬁsh. If pecuniary incentives work to increase the payoffs to the selﬁshly motivated relative to those motivated by
are however, then they discourage the development of caring dispositional type and crowd out voluntary cooperation. In
his way the incentives substitute for social preferences, allowing the selﬁsh to achieve for themselves what was formerly
chievable by the other-regarding alone.
43 Refer to Appendix A for an explicit formulation.
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6.3.1. Taxes on competition
Consider a policy that takes the form of a tax the Competitive activity. Though policy makers are generally not
accustomed to thinking of incentive schemes in these terms, many policies do in fact have the character of discriminat-
ing among cooperative and competitive activities. For example, many jurisdictions impose taxes on luxury (positional)
goods.
Within our framework, we consider a marginal tax of i on each unit of effort yi exerted in the Competitive setting.
We assume that since differently motivated individuals engage in different levels of competition, the tax can effectively
discriminate by motive, for example by taxing only high levels of competition.44 Assume also that it can allocate the revenue
from this task in lump sum form. The payoff to the Competitive activity now becomes
Vij ≡ −yiyj + (aK − i) yi − bKyj −
dK
2
y2i + Ri, (19)
where Ri is a lump sum transfer.
The institution must balance its budget, meaning that it can disburse as a lump sum an amount equal to the total amount
of tax revenue TK.
Since policymakers often focus on the “worst offenders,” we  assume that taxes are only imposed on those engaging
the most intensely in competition (meaning the Care-motivated are not taxed, (i.e. c = 0, see above) and that all the tax
revenue is remitted to those taxed45 (i.e. Rc = 0). We  ﬁrst derive the interaction payoffs under this tax scheme, and show that
there are static welfare gains from imposing the tax.46 We  will then show that by narrowing the difference in Competitive
setting interaction payoffs between c and r/s agents, that this policy also reduces the opportunity cost of developing the c
dispositional type, and therefore has additional positive externalities.
6.3.2. Static efﬁciency
Imposing a tax on effort in the Competitive setting increases static efﬁciency because taxes reduce the intensity of
competition. Since there are negative externalities associated with increased competition in this setting, agents exert too
much effort relative to what is socially optimal. Therefore appropriately set taxes can curb competition and thereby raise
efﬁciency.
6.3.3. Effects on reinforcement of dispositional types
It can be shown that raising taxes narrows the relative payoff disadvantage that Caring dispositional types face in the
Competitive setting (i.e. d (Vcc − Vsc)/ds, d (Vcs − Vss)/ds > 0).47 Using our equilibrium graphs, we can see that when the
disposition development curve shifts up, it intersects the social opportunities curve at a higher share of Caring dispositional
types (Fig. 5).
Note also that the tax does not affect the payoffs in Cooperative settings (i.e. dpCs /ds = 0). Intuitively, here the tax acts
as a relative penalty to developing the Selﬁsh or Responsive dispositional type, so some individuals whose probability of
participation in Cooperative settings was sufﬁciently low that they developed the r dispositional type before, will now ﬁnd it
44 While such an incentive scheme may  seem strange, many policies do in fact have the character of providing stronger incentives at lower levels of
pro-social behavior. For example, charitable contributions deducted from income subject to a progressive income tax are effectively subsidized at the
marginal tax rate. In this way, smaller charitable contributions are subsidized at a higher rate because the resulting taxable income is subject to a higher
tax  bracket.
45 Even though all tax revenue may  be refunded to the s- and r-dispositional-type agents, their utility may  go down. One can in principle however imagine
more  complex tax and transfer schemes that yield Pareto improvements. Because we will show that total welfare must go up, it will be possible to disburse
the  resulting surplus in a way  that leaves the more competitive agents no worse off and still promotes development of the c dispositional type.
46 Refer to Appendix A for a formal analysis.
47 See Appendix A.
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fFig. 6. Effect of cooperation subsidy on Selﬁsh dispositional type development.
ess costly to develop the c dispositional type. Since overall welfare is increasing in pKc , this policy has beneﬁcial second-order
ffects as well.
.3.4. Subsidies for cooperation
We  now consider a policy that promotes prosocial activity through the use of subsidies to interactions in the Cooperative
etting. Speciﬁcally, suppose that a policymaker provides a marginal subsidy of i to each unit of effort xi exerted in coop-
ration. We  assume that since effort contributions are monotonic in type, that the subsidy can discriminate by motive, for
xample by subsidizing only low levels of cooperation. Assume also that it can fund this subsidy through lump sum taxes.
he payoff to the Cooperative activity now becomes
Uij ≡ xixj + (aC + i) xi + bCxj −
dC
2
x2i − Ri, (20)
here Ri is a lump-sum tax.
The institution must balance its budget, meaning that it must raise a lump sum equal to the total amount of subsidy that
t disburses. Call this amount TC.
Since policymakers often focus on the “worst offenders”, we assume that subsidies are only provided to low cooperators
i.e. c = 0) and that all the tax revenue is raised from those subsidized (i.e. Rc = 0). We  ﬁrst derive the interaction payoffs
nder this subsidy scheme, and show that there are static welfare gains from providing the subsidy.48 We  will then show
hat by narrowing the difference in Cooperative setting interaction payoffs between s and c/r agents, that this policy also
educes the opportunity cost of developing the s dispositional type, and therefore has countervailing negative externalities.
.3.5. Static efﬁciency
Giving a subsidy for effort in the Cooperative setting increases static efﬁciency because subsidies increase the intensity
f cooperation. Since there are positive externalities associated with increased cooperation in this setting, agents exert too
ittle effort relative to what is socially optimal. Therefore appropriately set subsidies can bolster cooperation and thereby
aise efﬁciency.
.3.6. Effects on reinforcement of dispositional types
It can be shown that increasing subsidies narrows the relative payoff disadvantage that Selﬁsh dispositional types face
n the Cooperative setting (i.e. d (Ucc − Usc)/ds, d (Ucs − Uss)/ds < 0).49 Using our equilibrium graphs, we can see that
hen the disposition development curve shifts up, it intersects the social opportunities curve at a higher share of Caring
ispositional types (Fig. 6).
Note also that the subsidy does not affect the payoffs in Competitive settings (i.e. dpKc /ds = 0). Intuitively, here the
ubsidy acts as a relative penalty to developing the Caring or Responsive dispositional types, so some individuals whose
robability of participation in Competitive settings was  sufﬁciently low that they developed the r dispositional type before,
ill now ﬁnd it less costly to develop the s dispositional type. Since overall welfare is decreasing in pCs , this policy has
ountervailing second-order effects.
.4. Internal changeWe  now consider the effects of a policy that promotes the individual’s welfare from caring interactions. This may  take the
orm of support for mental training that enables the individual to achieve a greater payoff from providing Care. In particular,
48 Refer to Appendix A for a formal analysis.
49 See Appendix A.
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we suppose that an individual who has received such training experiences an extra payoff when engaging in the caring
activity (but no extra payoff when engaging in self-interested activities).
More speciﬁcally, we suppose that individuals are given the opportunity to pursue “compassion meditation” apart from
their interactions within Cooperative or Competitive social settings. While we  conceive of this activity as a setting, it is one
which people can choose to participate or not. Furthermore, we assume that agents’ utilities from this meditation activity
do not depend on the actions of others. In particular, suppose that compassion meditation yields a utility of
Uij ≡
(
1 − pCs
)
Uic + pCs Uis +
{
M − dM motive = c,
−dM motive /= c,
(21)
with M,  dM > 0 and M > dM. The parameter dM represents the cost of participation. Those individuals who  can employ the Care
motive (those with the r and c dispositional types) experience an additional utility of M − dM from engaging in compassion
meditation, whereas those who cannot (the s dispositional types) would experience only the cost dM and would refrain from
choosing to participate in this setting.
These self-chosen settings will have an effect on dispositional type reinforcement. The cost parameter dM affects the
cutoff at which people switch between r and s dispositional types. In this context, the cutoff equation (14) may  be modiﬁed
as follows:
s =  − M + dM(
1 − pCs
)
(Ucc − Usc) + pCs (Ucs − Uss)
. (22)
An internal change policy can affect the equilibrium distribution of dispositional types by making compassion meditation
more widely accessible, for example. This would take the form of a reduction in dM. The resulting shift in the disposition
development curve is illustrated in Fig. 7.
The ﬁgure shows that this internal-change policy leads to a fall in the likelihood of encountering a selﬁsh agent in a
Cooperative setting (pCs ) and a fall in the share of selﬁsh agents (
s).
7. Concluding remarks
One major reason for the evolutionary success of humans lies in their ability to cooperate. Mainstream economics views
humans as self-interested, rational individuals, and thus all cooperation among them must take the form of economic
synergies. These synergies occur when individuals exploit available gains from trade, as described by Adam Smith’s “invisible
hand” mechanism. This paper, by contrast, explores social avenues of cooperation that have been largely ignored in economics
thus far. We  began from the premise that economic cooperation presupposes social cooperation, since people who  lack
trust in and goodwill toward one another are unlikely to be either willing or able to exploit existing gains from trade. The
paper addresses both proximate and ultimate sources of cooperation. The proximate sources explain people’s cooperative
decisions in terms of their objectives, which may  be both individualistic (as in mainstream economics) and pro-social. Unlike
the standard models of pro-social behavior in behavioral economics (where pro-social preferences are assumed to be located
in the minds of individuals and thus wholly ascribable to them), in our model preferences are the outcome of the interplay
between the individual and her environment, inﬂuenced by the individual’s dispositional type and her social interactions
within her social settings. The ultimate sources of cooperation explains these preferences in terms of the evolutionary forces
acting on them. In this sense, our model is a preliminary attempt to account for the existence and prevalence of particular
dispositional types and their relation to social settings and the broader social topography.
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Our analysis addresses these phenomena by recognizing that all economic decisions are motivated and that people’s
otives depend on their dispositional types and social settings. For simplicity, we  considered three dispositional types:
aring, Selﬁsh and Responsive. The motives of Responsive individuals may  be elicited by their social setting, of which we
onsidered two: one entailing Cooperative interactions (where people’s contributions are complementary) and one entailing
ompetitive interactions (where their contributions are substitutable). The sum of these social settings, aggregated over all
gents, determines the social topography. The relative ﬁtness of the various dispositional types determines their evolution.
In short, the degree of cooperation in an economy is portrayed as the outcome of reﬂexive interplay between people’s
ndividual economic decisions and the social forces to which they are subject. Their individual decisions determine the
utcomes of their social interactions, which inﬂuence the relative ﬁtness of dispositional types and their social topography,
hich in turn inﬂuences their individual decisions. In the course of these reﬂexive interactions, people’s social preferences
nd their social topography co-evolve. In our model, Selﬁsh dispositional types do not necessarily drive Caring and Responsive
ispositional types out of existence. Rather, all dispositional types coexist in an environment of idiosyncratically varying
ocial contexts. This coexistence of disposition types represents a “social balance,” in which different agents survive in
rocess of interacting with one another.
In this way, our paper is a ﬁrst modest step towards explaining why people are prone to cooperate beyond what individ-
alistic responses to economic synergies would imply; how this cooperation depends on their dispositional types, settings
nd social topography; why people vary in their willingness to cooperate even under identical environmental conditions;
nd how their dispositional type, preferences and social topography evolve. We  contribute to the literature on the evolution
f preferences (e.g. Robson and Samuelson, 2011) by analyzing how a variety of contexts can support a stable population of
eterogeneous types. This literature typically features considerations of only how one game favors the survival of a particular
et of preferences, but usually does not consider multiple environments with differing incentives, and to our knowledge has
ever considered preferences that change across environmental contexts.
Finally, our analysis is a preliminary attempt to explore how policies that promote pro-social behavior (by affecting
eople’s internal and external environments) may  affect the evolution of dispositional types and social contexts. In this
espect, our analysis seeks to identify new conceptual avenues for addressing insufﬁcient cooperation in society. Whereas
ainstream economics addresses them by proposing pecuniary incentives, regulations, and institutional changes that induce
elf-interested, rational agents to internalize existing externalities, our approach both cautions that these policies may  have
nintended consequences and points to social, educational and institutional changes, which might affect people’s degree of
ro-sociality through the settings they encounter, their payoffs from these settings, and the ﬁtness of different dispositional
ypes.
ppendix A. Details of policy exercises
.1. Welfare framework
The total welfare function W is expressed
W = 
((
1 − pCs
)  ((
1 − pCs
)
Ucc + pCs Ucs
)
+ pCs
((
1 − pCs
)
Usc + pCs Uss
))
+ (1 − )
(
pKc
(
pKc V
cc +
(
1 − pKc
)
Vcs
)
+
(
1 − pKc
)  (
pKc V
sc +
(
1 − pKc
)
Vss
))
+ T,
here the term T represents any relevant lump-sum transfers.
We can collect terms and rearrange:
W = 
((
1 − pCs
)2
Ucc + pCs
(
1 − pCs
)  (
Ucs + Usc
)
+
(
pCs
)2
Uss
)
+ (1 − )
((
pKc
)2
Vcc + pKc
(
1 − pKc
)  (
Vcs + Vsc
)
+
(
1 − pKc
)2
Vss
)
+ T.
.2. Promotion of Cooperative settings
.2.1. Static efﬁciency
Let us partially differentiate welfare W with respect to  (ignoring any second-order effects on dispositional types for theoment):
∂W
∂
=
(
1 − pCs
)2
Ucc + pCs
(
1 − pCs
)  (
Ucs + Usc
)
+
(
pCs
)2
Uss −
((
pKc
)2
Vcc + pKc
(
1 − pKc
)  (
Vcs + Vsc
)
+
(
1 − pKc
)2
Vss
)
.
hether this is positive or negative depends on whether the Cooperative or Competitive setting produces higher payoffs.
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Table  4
Agents’ contributions to competitive setting interactions under competition taxes.
Other’s motive
Self-interest (s) motive Caring (c) motive
ss aK − sc (1−)((dK −1)aK −dK s)+bKOwn s y =
dK +1 y = (1−)d2
K
−1
c ycs = ((1−)dK −1)aK −bK dK +s
(1−)d2
K
−1 y
cc = (1−)aK −bK(1−)dK +1
A.3. Taxes on competition
A.3.1. Interaction payoffs and static efﬁciency
We will use the small change in parameterizations to modify Table 1 in a straightforward way. Table 4 displays the
contributions under the tax scheme.
The tax revenue TK can be expressed
TK =  (1 − )
(
1 − pKc
)  (
pKc y
sc +
(
1 − pKc
)
yss
)
meaning that the tax is levied only in the Competitive setting, on the most competitive agents (those with r and s dispositional
types), to a degree that depends on their level of competitiveness, which in turn depends on their likelihood of meeting a c
dispositional type.
Let us partially differentiate the welfare W with respect to s (ignoring any second-order effects on dispositional types
for the moment). It will clarify to further decompose this into the partial effect of the tax s on welfare holding the yij ﬁxed,
and the effect of the tax on the yij:
dW
ds
= ∂W
∂s
+
∑
yij
∂W
∂yij
· dyij
ds
.
Note that ∂W/∂s = 0 since there are revenue-neutral lump-sum transfers involved. We  know that the ∂W/∂yij are negative
by Eq. (19), and we can see that dyss/ds, dysc/ds, and dycc/ds are non-positive. While dycs/ds is positive, we can note that
ycs goes up by less than the amount ysc goes up by under our parametric assumption dK > 2. Furthermore, due to the nature
of the multiplicative term in Eq. (19), ∂W/∂ysc is larger than ∂W/∂ycs since ysc > ycs for small taxes.
A.3.2. Effects on reinforcement of dispositional types
This result relies on the fact that
d
(
Vcc − Vsc
)
/ds =
d2K (1 − )2 (aK (dK − 1) − dKs) + bK
(
d2K
(
1 − 2
)
− 1
)
(
1 − d2
k
(1 − )
)2 > 0,
and
d
(
Vcs − Vss
)
/ds =
(
aK
(
d2K
((
dK
(
d2K + dK + 2
)
+ 1
)
2 − 2 (dK + 1)d2K +
(
d2K + dK − 1
)
dK +  − 1
)
− 
)
+ bK (dK + 1) (dK (dK (dK (1 − 2 (1 − )) −  (1  − ) + 1) − 1) −  − 1)
− dKs
(
dK
(
dK
(
d2K (1 − )2 + 4 − 3
)
+ 4 − 2
)
+ 2
))
/
(
(dK + 1)2
(
1 − d2K (1 − )
)2)
> 0.
A.4. Subsidies for cooperation
A.4.1. Interaction payoffs and static efﬁciency
We modify the calculations of Table 1 in a straightforward way to show the contributions of the agents under cooperation
subsidies in Table 5.
Note that we are now considering only the cooperation subsidy in isolation. The cost of the subsidy will equal
TC = pCs
((
1 − pCs
)
xsc + pCs xss
)
,meaning that the subsidy is given only in the Cooperative setting, to the least cooperative agents (those with s dispositional
types) to a degree that depends on their level of cooperativeness, which in turn depends on their likelihood of meeting a c
or r dispositional type.
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Table  5
Agents’ contributions to the cooperative setting interaction under cooperation subsidies.
Other’s motive
Self-interest (s) motive Caring (c) motive
Own  s xss = aC +s xsc = (1−)((dC +1)aC +dCs)+bC
f
ﬁ
b
A
a
R
A
A
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
C
C
D
D
D
D
E
F
F
FdC −1 (1−)d2
C
−1
c xcs = ((1−)dC +1)aC +bC dC +s
(1−)d2
C
−1 x
cc = (1−)aC +bC(1−)dC −1
Let us partially differentiate the welfare W with respect to s (ignoring any second-order effects on dispositional types
or the moment). It will clarify to further decompose this into the partial effect of the subsidy s on welfare holding the xij
xed, and the effect of the subsidy on the xij:
dW
ds
= ∂W
∂s
+
∑
xij
∂W
∂xij
· dxij
ds
.
Note that ∂W/∂s = 0 since there are revenue-neutral lump-sum transfers involved. We  know that the ∂W/∂xij are positive
y Eq. (20), and we can see that each of dxss/ds, dxsc/ds, dxcs/ds, and dxcc/ds are non-negative.
.4.2. Effects on reinforcement of dispositional types
This result relies on the fact that
d
(
Ucc − Usc
)
/ds =
bC
(
1 − d2C
(
1 − 2
))
− d2C (1 − )2 (aC + dC (aC + s))(
1 − d2C (1 − )
)2 < 0,
nd
d
(
Ucs − Uss
)
/ds =
(
bC (dC − 1)
(
d3C (2 (1 − ) − 1) + d2C (1 −  (1  − )) + dC −  − 1
)
+ aC
(
d2C
(
dC − 1 + d2C (1 − )2 − d3C (1 − )2 +  − (2dC − 1)2
)
− 
)
− dC
(
2 + dC
(
2 + d3C (1 − )2 − 4 + dC (4 − 3)
))
s
)
/
(
(dC − 1)2
(
1 − d2C (1 − )
)2)
< 0.
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